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Abstract 
EU and twelve countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) engaged in 1995 in 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in political, economic and cultural matters 
with the aim to foster cooperation, stability, and prosperity around the Mediterranean Ba-
sin. The Economic and Financial Partnership (EFP) plays a central role in the EMP design 
and implementation, which is centered on economic and trade integration as a starting 
point for and an anchor of socioeconomic development in the MENA region. Against this 
background, this paper reviews the situation in the MENA partner countries and the past 
performance of the EFP. It analyzes the association agreements, economic cooperation and 
financial assistance, discusses the major obstacles, and outlines the potential of the EFP to 
shape the European Neighborhood Policy. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Erfolge und Herausforderungen der Euro-Mediterranen Wirtschafts- und Finanzpart-
nerschaft. Eine Bilanz nach zehn Jahren 
Seit 1995 engagieren sich die EU und zwölf Mittelmeerdrittländer in der Euro-Medi-
terranen Partnerschaft (EMP), die sicherheitspolitische, wirtschaftliche und kulturelle 
Themen umfasst, mit dem Ziel, Zusammenarbeit, Stabilität und Wohlstand im Mittel-
meerraum zu fördern. Die Euro-Mediterrane Wirtschafts- und Finanzpartnerschaft (EFP) 
spielt eine wichtige Rolle in der Struktur und Umsetzung der EMP, die sich auf 
wirtschaftliche Integration und Handelsbeziehungen als Ausgangs- und Angelpunkte 
sozioökonomischer Entwicklung im Mittelmeerraum stützt. Vor diesem Hintergrund 
evaluiert der vorliegende Beitrag die Situation in den Mittelmeerdrittländern sowie die 
bisherigen Leistung der EFP und diskutiert Lösungsansätze für die wichtigsten Problem-
felder. Darüber hinaus wird das Potential der EFP zur Gestaltung der Europäischen 
Nachbarschaftspolitik skizziert. 
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1. Introduction 
In a favorable environment, the EU-15 and 12 countries of the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) (Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, 
Turkey and – though not a state – West Bank/Gaza Strip) signed the Barcelona Declaration 
in 1995 and engaged in a strategic process of cooperation around the Mediterranean Basin 
(Barcelona Process). The end of the second Gulf war and the successfully concluded Israeli-
Palestinian Oslo Agreements brought about optimism towards a normalization in the re-
gion. The progress of the Middle East Peace Process was considered to be irreversible, and 
so was the establishment of peace. Accordingly ambitious was the aim: creating a zone of 
peace, stability and shared prosperity around the Mediterranean Basin based on the com-
prehensive Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in political, economic and cultural mat-
ters (Euromed, 1995). But the geopolitical context has worsened since 1995. 
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Celebrating its 10th anniversary in 2005, the performance of the Euro-Mediterranean part-
nership is vividly discussed in specialized literature. Many contributions concentrate on the 
cultural and security dimensions of the EMP, but only few scholars focus on the economic 
and financial dimension encompassed in the Economic and Financial Partnership (EFP). 
This is especially surprising, as the EFP plays a central role in the design, rationale and im-
plementation of the EMP: Economic integration has proven to be a major source of continu-
ous interaction between the Euromed partners in recent times of severe political tensions 
and institutional changes. Moreover, the EFP has developed the most dynamic and ad-
vanced implementation of the Barcelona Process. Over 90 per cent of the funds provided for 
the EMP are allocated to the EFP. Finally, and most importantly, the EMP takes economic 
and trade integration as a starting point for and an anchor of socioeconomic development in 
the Mediterranean region. The EMP is centered on the EFP and on the expected positive 
effects of establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EMFTA), which will be 
the world's largest market entity comprising over 800 million people, who operate more 
than 60 per cent of total trade among each other. Reflecting the strategic nature of the Barce-
lona Process, the ambitious aim of the EFP is not free trade itself, but acceleration of the pace 
of sustainable socioeconomic development in the region, through improvement of living 
conditions, an increase in employment level, reduction of the development gap, and encour-
agement of regional cooperation and integration (Euromed 1995). 
Therefore, the EFP complements trade liberalization with measures of economic cooperation 
and financial assistance. The EFP has three pillars: Euro-Mediterranean Association Agree-
ments (EMAAs) between the EU and each one of the MPs, economic cooperation, and fi-
nally, financial assistance through MEDA (cf. figure 1). Both of the latter pillars aim to 
smooth consequences from economic reforms, and alleviate adjustment costs. 
 
Figure 1: Structure of the Economic and Financial Partnership 
 
Source: Author’s illustration. 
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The EMP and EFP distinguish between two levels of cooperation: The regional level, on the 
one hand, involves all 15+12 partners. The Euro-Mediterranean conference takes place every 
two years on the foreign minister level. Following the principles of one-nation-one-vote and 
a strict unanimous voting procedure, equal rights for all participants are institutionalized. 
The bilateral level, on the other hand only includes the EU and one MP (15+1). Conse-
quently, measures that have been agreed upon bilaterally, are only binding for the EU and 
one respective MP. These bilateral activities concerning different MPs are operated simulta-
neously (cf. figure 1). 
The recent eastward expansion of the EU and the introduction of the European Neighbor-
hood Policy (ENP) in 2003, changed the international and regional setting in which the EMP 
was placed ten years ago and represent a thorough challenge to Euro-Med relations: After 
the enlargement, the EU today counts 25 members (including the former MPs Malta and 
Cyprus), four potential candidates are negotiating the accession (among them Turkey) and 
the remaining 9 MPs are now a subgroup of 16 neighbor countries at the EU's new borders. 
The present paper argues that in order to provide a proper and constructive evaluation of 
the EMP, it is important to consider the economic and financial dimensions in the design 
and rationale of the Euro-Med Partnership. EFP tools need to be assessed in relation to the 
high expectations, but also in relation to the high costs of economic adjustment on the side 
of the MPs. Against this background, this paper reviews the past performance of the EFP by 
analyzing the association agreements, economic cooperation, and financial assistance 
through MEDA. Based on this analysis, it outlines the major obstacles that impede full bene-
fits on both shores of the Mediterranean. Finally, the results of the evaluation will be dis-
cussed with respect to the role and opportunity of the EFP in shaping the recently intro-
duced European Neighborhood Policy. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the provisions, meas-
ures and tools of the EFP and its past performance. Section 3 relates these findings to the 
high expectations raised in the course of the EMP, which commonly serve as a benchmark in 
literature, to the anticipated mechanism, as well as to the actual economic and institutional 
situation in the Arab Mediterranean partner countries. Section 4 discusses major obstacles, 
future challenges and the necessity of appropriate benchmarks in this context. Finally, sec-
tion 5 outlines the research perspectives and concludes. 
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2. Euro-Mediterranean Economic and Financial Partnership 
Three circumstances account for the enforced EU engagement in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA), leading to the establishment of the EMP and the signature of the Barcelona 
Declaration in 1995: First, the euphoria after the successfully concluded Oslo Agreements, in 
1993 and 1995, and the anticipated end of the Middle East Conflict, as already mentioned 
above. Second, the completed northbound expansion of the EU stoked fears of marginaliza-
tion in the southern EU member countries. Spain, France and Italy only agreed to accession 
talks with Eastern European countries, after the European Council resolved upon a common 
European policy towards the non-candidate Mediterranean countries. Third, with the end of 
the cold war, the risk perception of the EU shifted towards the soft or new risk of the politi-
cally and economically unstable MENA region (Jünemann 2005). In the past decade, the re-
lations between the EU and the Mediterranean Partners (MPs) suffered under great strain 
from new and persistent escalations and violence between Israelis and Palestinians, terror-
ism (9/11, bomb attacks, hostage dramas) and conflict in Iraq. Floods of MENA immigrants 
on European shores, large scale unemployment and the lack of economic perspectives at 
home. Increasing agitation among citizens with migration background (Öcalan Affair in 
Germany, riots in France) as well as misperception and disinformation (cartoons of Prophet 
Muhammad) worsen the situation and carry the conflicts and problems of the region more 
and more into the EU itself. 
Although the EMP was to a large extend motivated by European security concerns, it is 
based on an economic rationale, which is partially resulting from the EU's own positive ex-
perience with economic integration. The EMP is based on the anticipation that trade func-
tions as an anchor of regional integration and economic cooperation as the necessary cata-
lyst. This mechanism is derived from economic theory on innovation and growth, as well as 
on international trade: Ideally, economies committing themselves to more openness and 
increased integration into international markets will benefit from increased foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and technology transfer. With the help of recent technologies, industries 
and products become more productive and thus increasingly competitive on international 
markets. Growing economies contribute to socioeconomic development of their country, 
because jobs are created, salaries raise and living conditions generally improve (cf. figure 2). 
A healthy degree of interaction and prosperity is thus considered to be the basis also for 
regional stability. Drawing on this mechanism, the EFP is based on three pillars in order to 
achieve a socially and economically sound integration and transition of the MPs: (1) the pro-
gressive conclusion of Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements, (2) economic coopera-
tion and concerted action, as well as (3) financial assistance. 
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Figure 2: The Anticipated Mechanism: From Trade to Development 
 
Source: Author’s illustration. 
 
2.1. Economic Liberalization: Trade and Openness 
The first objective of the EFP is to foster trade and openness in the region, in order to im-
prove competitiveness and foreign investment inflows, by spurring international exchange, 
and also by locking the MP economies on to the world market. The central instrument to 
achieve this goal is the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EMFTA). 
The target date is 2010, providing a 12 year transition period for MPs. As mentioned above, 
by the time all Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAAs) have entered into 
force and the Union's eastward expansion will have been completed, EMFTA will comprise 
over 40 countries and about 800 million people. 
According to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), free trade areas together 
with customs unions, are an important exemption to the most favored nation treatment. In 
contrast to WTO trade liberalization, the negotiations of the EMAAs are led bilaterally be-
tween the EU and one MP (15+1 negotiations), in order to be able to take the special eco-
nomic situation of each MP (i.e. speed of structural adjustment and/or liberalization and 
commitment to the process) into account. Thus, the EMFTA is gradually established through 
a network of "pluri-bilateral" (Jünemann 2001) EMAAs. These take the traditional trade 
flows between the EU and the MPs as the starting point for progressively elimination tariff 
and non-tariff protection (Euromed 1995). 
By now, negotiations on the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements are concluded 
and signed with all MPs, except Syria. EMAAs with Tunisia, Israel, Morocco, Jordan, Leba-
non and Egypt are ratified and entered into force (in the respective order).1 The first EMAA, 
                                                     
1 However, Cyprus and Malta have joined the EU as full members in 2004. Turkey is nominated to 
be a candidate country, but negotiations have not yet started. The impact and challenges due to  
10 Brach: Ten Years after: Achievements and Challenges 
which was signed in 1995 between the EU and Tunisia entered into force in 1998, is consid-
ered to be the archetype of all EMAAs (Zaim 1999) and has served as a reference in subse-
quent negotiations (Ghesquiere 1998). The EMAAs reflect the comprehensive approach of 
the Barcelona Process and comprise provisions that go beyond traditional WTO free trade 
agreements. They contain clauses dealing with basic principles such as the respect for hu-
man rights, political dialogue or cultural and social matters. Economic cooperation and es-
pecially financial aid form the side of the EU are conditional on the respect of these clauses. 
Bilateral trade relations between the EU and the MPs have traditionally been strong. Today 
they are solid: the EU is the main partner of the MPs, accounting on average for almost 50 
per cent of the MP's total trade. Especially Maghreb countries are intensely connected to the 
EU, in particular Tunisia where the EU accounts for over three quarters of its total trade. 
With an average of around a third of their total trade being directed at the EU, Jordan, Egypt 
and Israel are the least focused on trade with the EU in the Mediterranean region (cf. section 
3 and table 1). 
Already existing trade links have been strengthened over the past ten years: The annual 
growth of exports between 1994 and 2004 was 7.7 per cent and 10.3 per cent from the EU to 
the MPs and vice versa (World Bank 2006). The MPs have a structural trade deficit towards 
the EU. MPs import almost double the value of what they export to the EU, particularly ma-
chinery and transport equipment (Handoussa, Reiffers 2002). In 2005, MPs accounted for 8.5 
per cent of total EU-25 external trade. Thus, the Mediterranean region as a whole is the 
fourth most important trade partner of the EU, ranking after the USA, EFTA and China a 
head of Russia and Japan (EUROSTAT 2006). Turkey, Israel and Morocco are the main trad-
ing partners of the EU from the MPs that together make up a little more than 60 per cent of 
the total EU-MP trade volume. 
 
2.2. Economic Cooperation: Productivity and Competitiveness 
Economic cooperation is the EFP's second pillar. Its objective is to increase productivity and 
competitiveness in each MP, as well as in the region as a whole, by opening communication 
channels and building capacities for technology transfer. Bilateral cooperation is oriented 
towards upgrading the MP's infrastructure and providing support for restructuring (Hoek-
mann 1999). The measures of the bilateral economic cooperation are settled in the EMAAs to 
support the MP's own effort to achieve sustainable socio-economic development. The range 
of methods is manifold, providing a.o. for information exchange through expert exchange, 
expert services and technical assistance, and encouraging joint ventures. Economic dialogue 
                                                                                                                                                                     
institutional changes within the EU such as the enlargement or European Neighborhood policy 
will be discussed a later section of the paper. 
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is established in more than 18 fields of collaboration. These include matters of industrial 
cooperation, investor friendly climate, transport, telecommunications and customs matters, 
but also money laundering and drug trafficking. Regional economic cooperation provides 
for all-party cooperation in eight economic sectors: industry, environment, water manage-
ment, information society, energy, trade, transport and agriculture. The objective is to 
strengthen the sensitivity of the MPs to common problems, to institutionalize cooperation 
and to agree on tangible regional programs. Given the special situation in the Mediterra-
nean, establishing a positive experience of win-win situations, collaboration and trust is a 
complex task (cf. section 3). 
The interconnection of infrastructures, concerted reforms, as well as a harmonization of legal 
and administrative frameworks are preconditions for the region to become more competi-
tive and attractive as compared to other developing regions. Although (bilateral) trade links 
between the EU and the Mediterranean have been, as mentioned earlier, traditionally solid, 
regional cooperation gained momentum only slowly since 2001. Special working groups2 
aim at facilitating trade and investment among the partners. They are working on an action 
plan on the convergence of competition and customs legislation, which covers important 
issues such as the convergence of norms, industrial standards, and intellectual property 
rights. In 2002, the EMP members agreed to the general participation of MPs in the pan-
European cumulation of origin (Euromed Report 2002a). However, cumulation of origin is 
still only possible among Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria, because the EMAAs are not yet 
amended (cf. section 4). 
 
2.3. Financial Assistance: MEDA 
The EFP's third pillar is financial assistance. Its purpose is two-fold. The first is to encourage 
economic transformation by creating incentives. The second is to alleviate adjustment costs. 
By providing these funds, the EU stresses its commitment to turn abstract EMP objectives 
into tangible projects. The assistance is mainly provided through the MEDA-Program3 and 
the assistance of the European Investment Bank (EIB), which together account for almost 90 
per cent of the EUR 14.580 million committed to the Mediterranean region between 1995 and 
2006. All MEDA funds are grants from the EU and do not have to be paid back. MEDA's 
financial support generally applies to all three chapters of the EMP, but over three quarters 
of the funds are allocated for activities within the EFP. In contrast to the pre-Barcelona Fi-
nancial Protocols, the MEDA program is a global fund without fixed percentages or 
                                                     
2 WG on Rules of Origin and WG on Trade Measures Relevant for Regional Integration. 
3 Mesures d’accompagnement financiers et techniques à la réforme des structures économiques et 
sociales dans le cadre du partenariat euro-mediterranéen. 
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amounts per MP (Parfitt 1997). The amount that each MP receives depends on its efforts and 
progress, i.e. the allocation of the funds is based on competition between countries, between 
projects in the same country, as well as between regional projects. MEDA-Regulation pro-
vides two other very important details: First, beneficiaries of MEDA support do not neces-
sarily have to be states or regions. This provision allows immediate and decentralized sup-
port to all levels of hierarchy. It also requires a high degree of capabilities on site, in order to 
ensure equal access. Second, Article 3 supplies a political conditionality of MEDA funds; i.e. 
payments can be frozen or cancelled when the principles or details of the EFP or the Political 
and Security Partnership (cf. figure 1) are violated. This clause stresses the interdependency 
of all three chapters of the EMP and reflects its comprehensive approach. But it is also con-
troversial, because the clause is not further specified. This is the main reason why, until 
now, Article 3 has not yet been called upon. 
Originally, the amount of EMP resources was related to the funds granted to the CC-13, in 
preparation of the EU's eastward expansion, to a ratio of 40:60. This translates into EUR 
3.435 million for the period of 1995-1999, the so called MEDA I program (European Com-
mission 1995b). 86 per cent (EUR 2.954 Mio) of the MEDA I resources (1995-2000) were allo-
cated to bilateral support, in contrast to 12 per cent (EUR 418 Mio) that were spent on re-
gional cooperation (European Commission, 2001). As mentioned above, about 90 per cent of 
all committed funds were dedicated to measures of the EFP. However, on average only a 
third of committed funds was disbursed (cf. figure 3). Whereas the Palestinian Territories, 
Jordan and Tunisia had implementation rates around 40 per cent, and the commit-
ment/payment ratio for regional assistance reached nearly 48 per cent, Syria did not get any 
of the committed means. Turkey managed to activate only 5 per cent of possible payments. 
This poor performance can partially be explained with the complex and bureaucratic struc-
tures and procedures within the EU that lead to delays and hinder efficiency (Joffé 2001). On 
the other hand, the capacities in the MPs that are necessary in order to benefit from EU 
grants are not sufficiently developed. 
MEDA II (2000-2006) is an extensively revised version of MEDA I and more program-
oriented than its predecessor. MEDA II is supplied with extended financial resources, EUR 
5.350 million for the period 2000-2006 (European Commission, 2002) in addition to MEDA I 
leftovers that were committed but not implemented. The original key of distribution in rela-
tion to the CC-13 is not retained. Since the MEDA revision, the average implementation rate 
has almost tripled from 26 in 1999 to 74 per cent in 2002. Administration costs of technical 
assistance are reduced by half, leaving more means for projects. Additionally, regional sup-
port gained importance. The share of measures committed to regional projects raised from 
12 to 41 per cent of total MEDA II funds in the year 2001 (EUR 311,5 Mio). Thus the effec-
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tiveness of the financial assistance has significantly improved. However, figure 3 also re-
veals differences across countries. Payments match or even exceed commitments in Egypt, 
Jordan or Lebanon. Syria activated again only a small portion of the committed funds. 
MEDA II does still not sufficiently link actual compliance with action plans and reform pro-
gress to committed MEDA funds: the most active reformer MPs are not necessarily the ones 
who receive the highest per capita amount of MEDA funds (Tovias and Ugur 2004). 
 
Figure 3: MEDA I and II – Commitments vs. Payments by MP 
 
Source: Author‘s calculations based on Euromed 2000; European Commission 2002, 2003; EuropeAid 2005. 
 
 
3. Mediterranean Realities: Radical Changes and High Adjustment Costs 
The structures of the EFP are designed to support the aforementioned anticipated mecha-
nism, which will lead from trade liberalization and economic integration to increased com-
petitiveness, attractiveness and prosperity in the Mediterranean region. However, there is 
neither guaranty nor automatism to this mechanism. In academia the nexus of openness and 
trade is discussed contradictory. Insights on the role of FDI in spurring development, the 
nexus between trade and growth, as well as the impact and nature of international technol-
ogy spillovers derived from economic models mostly underlie very restrictive assumptions. 
Nevertheless, both the EU and the MPs communicated positive outcomes of the EMP almost 
as a matter of course. From the beginning both the EU and the MPs placed high expectations 
in the EFP. They presumed that inter- and intra-regional trade would increase substantially, 
that regional competitiveness would rise, that joined ventures would emerge, and finally 
that foreign direct investment (FDI) would “naturally” escalate with the process of establish-
ing the EMFTA (European Commission 1995a, 1995b). 
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This section provides a brief introduction to the economic and regional situation in the 
MENA, in order to assess the appropriateness of these expectations as a benchmark for EFP 
and EMP performance between 1995 and 2005. 
The countries centered around the Mediterranean Basin, the EU members on one side and 
the 12 MPs on the other, are very different with respect to the degree of sub-regional integra-
tion, culture, and economic development. However, they share a common history, religious 
roots, and past attempts of closer cooperation. EU countries are today the home for many 
immigrants and guest workers from the MPs (especially Turkey, Tunisia, Algeria and Mo-
rocco). Guest-worker remittances sent back to their home countries are economically impor-
tant, making up an average of 5 per cent of GDP in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia (World 
Bank 2001). 
Culturally are the MPs close to each other. The majority of the population are Semites (Ar-
abs and Jews), Arabic is the common language and Islam is the prevailing religion. How-
ever, in contrast to the EU member countries who share a common identity, common institu-
tions and a degree of national integration that is unique is the world, there is no shared 
Mediterranean identity.4 The MPs share general problems and difficulties of the region: the 
shortage of water and arable land. The high population growth is coupled with high rates of 
unemployment and widespread environmental damage. Despite these similarities and com-
mon concerns, politically concerted actions between the MPs barely exist. Economic and 
trade relations among the MPs are also limited. 
Table 1 tries to give a detailed overview of the region's variety: Not only population (400.000 
Malta vs. Turkey, over 71 Mio.) and surface (Malta, 320 km2 vs. Egypt, over 1 Mio. km2), but 
also the economic structure as well as economic performance differ significantly: Whereas 
the share of industry is close to 30 per cent of the GDP in all MPs (except in Algeria, 55 per 
cent), the share of agriculture varies from about 20 per cent in Egypt and Syria to less than 
three per cent of the GDP in Israel and Malta. The nature of industry at sector-level also var-
ies across the MPs. Algeria and Syria almost entirely depend on hydrocarbons, Egypt on 
hydrocarbons and fibers. The Jordanian economy is technologically more advanced. It suc-
cessfully exports chemical fertilizers and medicaments. The economies in Morocco and Tu-
nisia also have a diversified profile of exports (phosphorus, electrical applications or semi-
conductors), but with a stronghold in textiles.5 Lebanon economy has to recover from the 
summer 2006 conflict with Israel, but used to grow in print products, tobacco and phospho-
                                                     
4 As such the term Mediterranean Partners (MP) is misleading. This term was first introduced and 
established by the EU, referring to the fact that all MPs (except Jordan) are bordering the Mediter-
ranean Sea. 
5 For more details on MP key products, refer e.g. World Economic Forum (2003). 
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rus. Services account for a relative high share of the GDP, ranging between 50 and 75 per 
cent in all MPs except in Egypt, Syria and Algeria. A look at the GDP per capita, reveals the 
development gap between the MPs and Europe on the one hand, and among the MPs on the 
other hand: Israel's GDP per capita (US$ 19,070) is higher than those of the southern Euro-
pean countries Greece, Portugal and Spain, whereas Jordan and Algeria barely touch 
US$ 2,000. Syria does not even reach US$ 1,000. The Human Development Index (HDI) rank-
ing stresses this observation. Only Cyprus, Malta and Israel are classified with high human 
development, the others are only rated medium to lower medium human development. 
The political systems in the region are manifold; the forms of government vary from repub-
lic, monarchy and democratic structures with a wide scope of interpretation to each term. 
Centralistic structures, extended bureaucracies and authoritative elements are common in 
all MPs. The new generation of leaders, educated at European and American universities, 
which took over the power from their fathers in Morocco (1999), Jordan (1999), and Syria 
(2000) cautiously consider new solutions to old problems. 
 
Table 1: Mediterranean Partner Countries – Selected General Statistics 2005 
 ALG CYP EGY ISR JOR LEB MAL MOR SYR TUN TUR WB/G
Form of Government Rep. Rep. Rep. Parl. Dem. Const. Mon. Rep. Rep. Mon. Pres. Rep. Rep. Parl. Dem.  
Area 1,000 km² 2,381.7 9.25 1,001.5 22.2 89.3 10.4 0.3 458.7 185.2 163.6 769.6 6.0 
Population mil. 31.8 0.8 68.1 6.7 5.3 4.5 0.4 30.1 17.4 9.9 70.7 3.1(01) 
   growth rate % 1.5 0.6 2.0 2.3 2.9 1.4 0.7 1.6 2.4 1.2 1.7 4.3(01) 
Unemployment % 23.7 3.4 9.9 10.7 13.9 8.5(00) 4.8 13.1 9.5(00) 14.3 9.4 14.1(00)
   under 25 years 53.6 3.0 20.4(99) 16.9 26.6 22.0(99) 6.3 19.9 -- 31.3(99) 13.0 20.0(99)
GDP mil. € 67,866 10,273(04) 123,039 127,167 11,312 20,125 3,881 40,853 22,109 24,231 246,224 4,648(99)
   growth rate % 5.3 3.7(04) 4.9 5.2 7.2 1.0 2.5 1.6 4.2 4.2 7.4 -- 
   per capita US$ 2,066 12,439(04) 1,662 184,906 2,091 5,627 9,604 1,354 1,161 2,418 3,390 1,640(99)
Economic Structure             
AGR % of GDP 8.3 3.8(00) 13.9 1.7(00) 2.2 7.3 2.8(02) 13.3 21.4 12.6 11.9 7.8(01) 
IND % of GDP 62.3 19.9(00) 38.7 25.0(00) 28.9 20.9 26.2(02) 31.2 26.1 28.2 23.7 17.4(01)
SERV % of GDP 29.4 76.3(00) 47.4 73.3(00) 68.8 71.7 68.71(02) 55.5 52.5 59.2 64.5 74.9(01)
Trade             
Total IM mil. US$(03) 13,533 4,466 10,893 34,211 5,653 71,767 2,727 13,731 5,111 10,147 69,340 2,440 
Total EX mil. US$(03) 24,612 923 6,161 31,783 3,082 1,524 1,959 8,777 5,731 7,354 47,253 349 
Merchandise % of GDP(04) 59.7 26.0 104.9 69.6 104.9 51.2 -- 54.7 46.7 79.6 53.1 -- 
Services % of GDP(04) -- -- 28.2 23.5 36.9 -- -- 20.3 19.1 19.9 11.7 -- 
IM from EU % of GDP(03) 59 56 26 41 10 43 64 61 19 72 46 16(99) 
EX to EU % of GDP(03) 59 56 33 27 3 9 41 76 57 80 52 0.2(99) 
HDI rank/177 103 29 119 23 90 81 32 124 106 89 94 102 
Sources: World Development Indicators 2006; Euro-Mediterranean Statistics 2002; Radwan and Reiffers 2005; 
Human Development Report 2006. 
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The economic linkage between the EU and the MPs are traditionally strong and solid (Que-
felec 2003a, 2003b). The EU is by far the most important trade partner with this region, ac-
counting on average for over 50 per cent of the total MP trade, as already mentioned. The 
economic systems of the MPs are partially shaped through the development policies such as 
import substitution and disintegration that they have pursued in the past. The industries are 
to a large extent specialized on import substitution industries with little integration into the 
world market. The MPs trade engagement in sectors with high international demand is low. 
Capacities to penetrate those markets remain insufficient and productivity is low 
(Handoussa and Reiffers 2002). Despite a constant decrease in tariffs throughout the years, 
the average tariff rate is still 6 per cent higher than in Latin America and 5 per cent higher 
than in the CC-13 (Handoussa and Reiffers 2002). Major parts of the domestic industries 
have little to no international experience, and many firms are not capable of competing in-
ternationally. Thus, increased competition and trade creation in the course of import liber-
alization will initially lead to an increase in unemployment. Additionally, the dismantling of 
tariffs on imports from Europe leads to revenue losses. In the MPs' state revenues, income 
taxes are of secondary importance, while indirect trade-related taxes remain the most impor-
tant components (Economic Research Forum 2000). Lebanon and the Maghreb countries 
suffer the most from these losses, because they have high trade deficits and obtain 50 to 75 
per cents of their imports from the EU. For these countries the losses are estimated to be be-
tween 16 and 31 per cent of the GDP (Nienhaus 1999). An exact estimation of the extent of 
the revenue losses, as well as of the increase in unemployment is difficult to forecast, due to 
the back-loaded character of tariff dismantling and because the liberalization of the products 
with the highest tariffs has only recently begun. Revenue losses of such a size are difficult to 
compensate. Tax reforms are needed. MP governments are forced to avoid expenditures and 
to cut subsidies. As a result, social services and investment outlays that are needed to allevi-
ate the social hardships for the populations decline (Ghesquiere 1998). However, structural 
attributes and sectoral strengths of MP economies are vast and vary significantly. Therefore, 
it is difficult to generalize the nature or impact of shock across the MPs. 
The economic structures reflect the mentality and cultural background of the region. Tradi-
tionally the state interferes actively in the economic process. Governments directly influence 
the performance of the national economy, e. g. through the administration of extensive sub-
sidies. Most states have huge and inefficient bureaucracies. In addition, state-owned firms or 
highly subsidized private companies are important elements of the employment policy and 
are often the bodies responsible for social services (Nienhaus 1999). As such, the role of the 
government in the EMP is controversial (e. g. Tovias and Ugur 2004). With the signature of 
the partnership, the national governments have accepted the role of implementing an envi-
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ronment that is conducive to increased performance, efficiency, competitiveness (Rhein 
1999) and transparency. Furthermore, the informal economy is estimated to be equivalent to 
as much as 40 per cent of the formal economy (Joffé 1998). Private networks and wasta (per-
sonal connections) play a prominent role in all areas of live and business. In certain 
branches, economic success seems to be based as much on connections as on merits (Joffé 
1998). Corruption is regarded to be a major constraint to the investment climate, ranging 
between 17 per cent in Morocco and Turkey, up to 35 per cent in Algeria and over 50 per 
cent in Egypt and Syria (World Bank 2006). Thus, liberalization of the domestic markets, 
competition, privatization, structural adjustment and reforms of the institutional framework 
(independent courts, harmonization of standards and norms etc.), in short the principles of a 
market economy and success based on merits, stand in sharp contradiction to the prevailing 
economic systems of most of the MPs. All MPs, albeit to different extents, have to reorganize 
their economic systems. These radical changes cause essential adjustment costs. As such, the 
EMAA's obligations constitute a very thorough internal and external challenge for each MP 
with essential impact on their economies, economic systems and beyond. Structural adjust-
ment breeds a chain reaction that affects not only the economic, but also the judicial and 
political structures. 
As mentioned above, it is difficult to generalize the nature and impact of the shocks as well 
as of the adjustment costs, because they affect MP countries differently. However, this sec-
tion gives an idea about the general situation and difficulties that the Mediterranean is con-
fronted with. 
 
 
4. Evaluation: Obstacles of the Past and Future Challenges 
There are two prevailing strands of argumentation in literature on the EMP. One strand (e.g. 
Masala 2000, Bessis 2005, Weipert 2006) concludes that the EMP has more or less failed be-
cause it was not able to materialize its aims and communicated expectations within the first 
decade. The other strand, especially official EU documentation, emphasizes that it is already 
a success that the process did not collapse, despite the difficult geopolitical context in which 
it is placed. In contrast, this paper aims to provide constructive and less generalist criticism, 
with special respect to the EFP. 
When analyzing the performance and importance of the economic dimension within the 
Barcelona Process, it becomes obvious that the EFP accounts for most of the visible progress. 
The EFP is the most effective realization of the Barcelona Process. Economic interaction is a 
major source of continuity in Euro-Mediterranean relations, throughout politically difficult 
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times. The EFP has shown many positive results. It became a dynamic process that institu-
tionalizes exchange, as well as bilateral and regional communication channels. The EFP es-
sentially contributes to establish the EMP as a stable and lasting framework of regional co-
operation. The mere number of conferences, working groups, meetings and activities under-
taken on a regular basis indicate the continuity of this process; expanding the dialogue on 
important regional concerns despite difficult regional and international settings (escalation 
of Middle East Conflict, events of September 11). The Barcelona Process is the only forum 
outside the United Nations where the conflicting parties continue to meet. Furthermore, the 
regional and international integration of the Mediterranean region improved since the estab-
lishment of the EFP. All MPs (except Syria) are now members of the WTO or negotiating 
accession (Algeria and Lebanon). Economic and institutional reforms have gained momen-
tum in the MPs (Handoussa and Reiffers 2001). MPs are undertaking considerable efforts to 
create a more investor friendly business environment. Sizeable regulatory framework re-
forms for investment are already implemented (Handoussa and Reiffers 2001). Most MPs 
currently show comparatively stable macroeconomic situation: Inflation rates are relatively 
small (less than ten per cent), budget deficits have been reduced, and even the high burden 
of debts is slightly declining. Financial assistance from the EU to MPs has been extended in 
comparison to the pre-Barcelona Financial Protocols. 
Thus, the Economic and Financial Partnership contributes to preventing the MPs falling into 
an international economic isolation in this difficult environment. Furthermore, economic 
cooperation and structural adjustment activities are preparing the region to be capable of 
greater benefits in more peaceful times. It also provides a firm foundation for intensified 
cooperation between the EU and the MPs. 
The EFP shows more significantly more progress than the other two EMP baskets (political 
and cultural matters). But EFP performance stays behind its own benchmarks, when being 
judged on the accomplishment of its, above-mentioned, explicit aims. Nevertheless, it is 
wrong to conclude that EFP has failed, because, as this paper shows, these expectations were 
from the beginning overly ambitious.6 The aims stated in the Barcelona Declaration are not 
the appropriate benchmark for a short to medium term evaluation of the past performance. 
Given the unrealistic nature of expectations towards the EFP, this paper argues that the im-
pact of the EFP should not only be judged by these expectations. Its context and construction 
as well as the economic situation of the MPs need to be considered. The central importance 
of the EFP for the EMP makes it especially important to provide an adequate evaluation of 
EFP performance. An objective assessment of its instruments and structures is a precondi-
                                                     
6 These high expectations are also considered to be a burden on Euro-Mediterranean relations, be-
cause the constant disappointment of expectations reduces the commitment (Brach 2002).  
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tion to using the experience of the past ten years and to meeting the new challenges of Euro-
Mediterranean relations. 
I now point out improvements that are necessary in order to exploit the possibilities that are 
at stake better. These adjustments can help to overcome past short-comings and to come to 
terms with future challenges, such as the EU enlargement and the introduction of ENP. 
 
4.1. Capacity Building and Commitment 
Despite sizable implementation of regulatory framework for investment, the business envi-
ronment is still not satisfactory. Investment codes are an important necessary, but not a suf-
ficient condition for attracting investment. Independent juridical systems that guarantee the 
enforceability and transparency of commercial administration, as well as political stability 
are as important for investor decisions as are labor, input or transportation costs. None of 
the MPs sufficiently meets these conditions. This reduces the efficiency of progress in single 
areas. 
Some structural adjustment measures even undermine other reforms. MP governments pri-
marily privatize profitable parts of state-owned enterprises in order to increase government 
income and keep the unprofitable parts in order to preserve jobs. As stated earlier, the state 
is often the most important employer in the MPs, accounting for over 50 per cent of the jobs 
in Jordan or Algeria, and still more than 35 per cent in Egypt, Morocco and Tunesia (Loewe, 
2004). State owned enterprises constantly create jobs, even if many of these jobs are redun-
dant. Privatizing these enterprises at a large scale, would put an extra strain on the already 
tight labor market. In addidtion, privatization in the MPs often leads to a partial transfer of 
state monopolies to private monopolies rather than competitive market structures 
(Handoussa and Reiffers 2001). In this manner privatization neither modernizes economic 
structures by improving competitiveness, nor does it counter investor distrust. Seen in this 
context, the distribution criteria for MEDA financial assistance do not give sufficient empha-
sis to limit rent-seeking behavior of the beneficiaries (Ghesqiere 1998). 
Furthermore, analysts continue to give too little attention to the fact that the economic struc-
ture in the MPs is based on small, family-run businesses that have little knowledge of EU 
standards and procedures. Although the share of high-technology exports has increased 
within the past ten years, they account for an average of less than 4 per cent of the total 
manufactured outputs (cf. table 2). Jordan and Tunisia are the only Arab MPs showing a 
technological readiness which is slightly above the international average of 3.7 (cf. table 2). 
Against this backdrop, it is no surprise that the attractiveness of the Mediterranean region to 
FDI has not changed significantly. European FDI in the MPs increased since 1994, but the 
worldwide level remains very low. In all MPs, except Jordan, FDI inflows are equivalent to 
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two or less per cent of GDP (cf. table 2). In contrast, FDI inflows make up an average of 13 
per cent GDP in Latin America, and four per cent in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa 
(World Bank 2006). Both, the EU and the MPs do not attach enough importance to the need 
for building technological and administrative capacities. On the one hand, more measures 
need to be taken to improve MP’s capacities to adapt existing technologies to their specific 
needs and to ensure a better diffusion of such technologies. On the other hand, better educa-
tion and more training is necessary to increase administrative capacities, e.g. to handle 
mandatory European standards on food safety. Small and family-run businesses will signifi-
cantly improve their chances to be successful on European and international markets. 
 
Table 2: Technological Competitiveness of the Mediterranean Partners 
High-Technology 
Exports 
(% of manuf. exports) 
Foreign Direct 
Investment 
(net inflows % of GDP) 
Technological 
Readiness 
(Index)  
1995 2004 1990 2004 1996 2005 
ALG 0.5 1.1 0.1 1.0 -- 2.7 
EGY 0.4 0.6 1.7 1.6 3.67 3.7 
ISR 15.8 18.8 0.3 1.4 4.07 6.2 
JOR 5.9 5.3 0.9 5.4 2.63 4.3 
LEB -- 2.0 0.2 1.3 -- -- 
MOR 0.5 10.2 0.6 1.5 -- 2.8 
SYR -- 1.0 0.6 1.1 -- -- 
TUN 1.6 4.9 0.6 2.1 -- 4.1 
TUR 1.3 2.0 0.5 0.9 3.40 3.8 
WB/G -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Sources: World Development Indicators 2006; Global Competitiveness Report 1996, 2006. 
 
4.2. Trade in Agricultural Products 
EMAAs are negotiated bilaterally in order to take the special situation of each MP into ac-
count, but de facto there is very little variance across the agreements (Hoekmann 1999). 
Trade of agricultural products accounts for six per cent of the total trade between the MPs 
and the EU. The MPs are therefore the second most important extra-EU trading partner after 
the US (Quefelec 2004a). Still, agricultural goods were form the beginning excluded. This led 
to a deadlock in EMAA negotiations with MPs heavily depending on agricultural products 
such as Morocco. Only since 2003 is a revision of the market access for agricultural products 
is on the Euromed agenda, but any success depends on an internal reform of the European 
Common Agricultural Policy, as well as the ongoing the WTO negotiations. 
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Trade in services is regulated within a limited scope, only referring to the provisions of the 
GATS. Although agricultural products are an important source of revenues in many MPs 
today, services increasingly gain importance as a more promising source of economic 
growth. Because EMFTA is de facto limited to trade in industrial goods, the MPs cannot ex-
pand their access to the European agricultural market far beyond the preferential treatment 
they were already granted since the 1970s. In this respect, EMFTA establishes a preferential 
unilateral opening on the side of the MPs for European exports, rather than reciprocal trade 
liberalization. 
The import of industrial goods from the MPs to the EU is also not generally free of customs, 
but is only granted if a 60 per cent local content requirement is met. This provides that 60 
per cent of the value added must originate from the exporting MP in order to enjoy duty-
free treatment (Licari 1998). So far, only EMAAs with Tunisia and Morocco allow an accu-
mulation of origin among each other and with Algeria. All other MPs have to produce the 
demanded value added themselves. 
These limitations of the EMAAs can be adequately explained with inner structures and con-
cerns of the EU. Trade in agricultural products and services are two very sensitive issues for 
the EU. The problems of the Common Agricultural Policy are widely discussed and a solu-
tion is not within reach at this point in time. As for trade in services, the EU member coun-
tries fear further waves of immigration from the MPs to the EU, if the freedoms of settle-
ment and movement are granted within the EMFTA. 
Although trade in agricultural products is an important feature to many MPs, especially in 
the Maghreb, the impact may well be overestimated, on both sides: The EU, in particular its 
southern member states such as France, Spain, Portugal and Greece, do not seem to realize, 
that the EU does already exports more agricultural products to the MPs than it imports 
(Quefelec 2003a, 2004a). The MP governments should also carefully consider that agricul-
tural production is not a pioneer sector, which bears many future growth or development 
prospects. 
The reluctance of the EU to tackle a reform of its Common Agricultural Policy and the diffi-
culties of the ongoing WTO round demonstrate how little progress liberalization in this sec-
tor is to be expected in the short to medium range. 
 
4.3. South-South Integration 
The development of Tunisia during the Partnership is widely as regarded a success story. 
Tunisia has gone the furthest on the way of structural adjustment showing a positive devel-
opment in important fields, such as macroeconomic stabilization, economic liberalization, 
and increased openness. Tunisia managed to increase industrial diversification, as well as 
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legal and institutional framework reforms (Handoussa and Reiffers 2002). However, the 
positive dynamic gains made, such as an increase in FDI inflows, do not match the expecta-
tions. The fact that the developments in model country Tunisia do not generate the expected 
results renders two important points. First, that benchmarks and expectations should be 
reconsidered, as already discussed. Second, one well performing MP cannot on its own com-
pensate for the disadvantageous regional setting. Economic integration and political coop-
eration among the MPs is indispensable for future development. Failing substantial multi-
lateral liberalization on a MFN basis, south-south integration represents a key element for 
the success of the region as a whole (Ghesquiere 1998). Linkages between the MPs can par-
tially compensate for the small domestic markets and facilitate economies of scale to in-
crease productivity (Handoussa and Reiffers, 2002). But also from a political point of view 
would the creation of agreements among the MPs be a signal for fostered habits of coopera-
tion and a normalization of relations between the MPs (Tovias and Bacaria 1999). The benefit 
of creating EMFTA is especially for the MPs increased, when they manage to link each other 
through free trade agreements. 
Obviously this is no easy task. Trade links between the MPs have traditionally (not includ-
ing the medieval era) been very low, accounting on average for less than 5 per cent of the 
total trade flows (Radwan and Reiffers 2005). In contrast, trade relations with Europe ac-
count on average for 45 per cent of the MPs' external trade. Previous attempts of intra-
regional economic cooperation and concerted action, e. g. Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) in 
1989 and the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) in 1998, were not successful. 
However, there is significant potential for development: Trade within the region in 2003 
accounts for less than one per cent of the total trade in Israel, but 14 per cent in Lebanon and 
Syria, and eight per cent in Jordan (Radwan and Reiffers 2005). The annual average growth 
rate between 1994 and 2004 for exports among the MPs was 14 per cent in comparison to 7.7 
per cent with the EU (World Bank 2006). Thus, the MPs' will to open up also among them 
increased during the Partnership. With the recent Agadir Process, the progress of economic 
cooperation gained a new momentum. Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia signed a free 
trade agreement among each other in March 2001, which is scheduled to enter into force in 
2006. This initiative is more promising than the past attempts. As opposed to the AMU it 
comprises MPs from the Maghreb (Tunisia, Morocco) and the Mashreq (Egypt, Jordan). The 
Agadir-Process extents the regional impact is extended and includes more complimentary 
economies. Compared to GAFTA it has a manageable size. Although regional and intra-
regional cooperation is a declared focus of the EFP, the possibilities to enhance south-south 
cooperation have not been exhausted. The EU only recently started to create more incen-
tives. Considerations to include the MPs into the pan-European system of origin are con-
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cluded, and the EMAAs can be amended. The share of MEDA funds dedicated to regional 
cooperation and projects increased. 
MP economies cannot separately compete with other emerging regional blocks (e. g. Latin 
America, Eastern Europe). Each individual MP market is too small and is located in an un-
certain environment. In times of an increasing global economy and decreasing transaction 
costs, proximity to the market is only one aspect among others that contribute to attract FDI. 
The general regional circumstances are at least as important as the performance of an indi-
vidual country. 
Clearly, south-south, or intra-regional, cooperation is needed to improve the MPs' perform-
ance, to improve their bargaining power and, above all, as a signal for normalization and 
cooperation in the region. However, the anchorage of reforms and liberalization in the MP 
through cooperation and deeper economic integration with the EU is already an asset that 
should not be underestimated. Especially against the background that there is neither mu-
tual political interest, nor substantial economic incentives for intra-regional trade as com-
pared to the possibilities the EU has to offer. In the framework of the EFP, a unique degree 
of economic integration is achieved between industrialized and their neighboring develop-
ing countries. Finally, recent economic research stresses the importance of high performing 
trade partners for domestic growth and performance of developing countries (e. g. Arora 
and Vamvakidis 2006). 
 
4.4. European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement 
Besides the deterioration of the Middle East Peace Process, especially the EU's eastward 
enlargement (2004) and the ENP (2003) affect the EFP fundamentally. In 1995, the EMP 
comprised 15 EU and 12 Mediterranean Partners. Today, the MPs are confronted with a dif-
ferent situation. The EU comprises 25 members (including the former MPs Malta and Cy-
prus)7. The ENP addresses the relations between the EU and its bordering countries, the 16 
neighbors: Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Libya, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan as well as 
the remaining nine MPs8. 
The aim of the EMP to “create a zone of shared security, peace and prosperity” has been 
recycled for the formulation of the goal of the ENP (Euromed 1995, European Commission 
2004). However, the ENP’s geographical basis is much broader and the EU shifted from a 
                                                     
7 Bulgaria and Rumania will join the EU within the next two years. Croatia and Turkey are candi-
date countries. Nominated potential candidates are Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia including 
Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia.  
8 Remaining MPs: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Israel, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and the Palestinian Au-
thority. Russia refused the participation in the ENP and holds a special status of a strategic part-
nership. 
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comprehensive regional approach to a policy of bilateral differentiation. In contrast to the 
MPs who share (despite all differences) a common culture, history and geographic prox-
imity, the neighbor countries (NCs) only have two things in common. They are direct 
neighbors to the enlarged EU and have, other than the CC-13 and potential candidates, no 
perspective to join the EU as member states. 
The ENP centers more directly on economic issues than the EMP and provides no social or 
cultural conditionality on cooperation. Whereas the EFP addresses socio-economic devel-
opment as a key objective, ENP wants to avoid fractions between Europe and its bordering 
countries. The closer economic integration of NCs to the European common market is the 
central objective. Compliance and progress of bilateral negotiated action plans will be the 
new benchmarks (positive conditionality). 
Although the EU stresses the complementary character of the ENP, to supplement existing 
policies such as the EMP, the ENP is also intended to streamline EU relations with the NCs. 
From 2007, all funds and budget lines providing financial assistance to these countries (e. g. 
MEDA, TACIS) will be melted together under the umbrella of the European Neighborhood 
Instrument (ENI). 
But until now, the ENP remains an emerging concept, which is not well defined in the very 
details. The outlines of the ENP resemble the provisions, goals and tools of the EFP. There-
fore the experience and evaluation of ten years EFP are valuable assets, which should be 
used to model the ENP in detail. 
The ENP is often criticized for two points. First, because it offers more value added to the 
former USSR republics than to the MPs, and second, because it partially abandons the idea 
of regional identification (e.g. Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005). Both points are correct. But 
nevertheless, is there a lot at stake for the MPs to gain, because the ENP provides new pos-
sible solutions and remedies to some of the past obstacles. The ENP outlines an integration 
of NCs in the EU common market, which in contrast to EMFTA is not restricted to the flows 
of goods, but includes all four freedoms (goods, services, people, money) and participation 
in the pan-European accumulation of origins, presented above. Furthermore, NCs are in-
cluded in the 7th European framework for research and innovation. Finally, given the lim-
ited sub-regional integration among the MPs and the missing regional identity, the intro-
duced positive conditionality can be a chance for each individual country to make progress 
visible. 
In contrast to the Eastern European and Caucasian NCs, the MPs look back on more than 10 
years EMP experience and long-grown intensive relations with the EU. Therefore, MPs can 
play a central and active role in shaping the ENP. In the years to come, MPs might also be 
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important mediators to bridge EU relations with potential neighbor countries such as Iraq 
and Iran, if Turkey is joining the EU at some point. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
The present paper investigates the economic and financial dimension of EMP, the Economic 
and Financial Partnership, and emphasizes its role and tools. It focuses on the question why 
the performance is suboptimal and discusses adjustments that are indispensable in order to 
overcome past shortcomings and to come to terms with the changed context and new chal-
lenges. 
Even though the EMP was to a large extent motivated by European security concerns, it 
rests upon an economic rationale and draws on economic policy measures. EMP considers 
trade liberalization as a starting point for and economic integration as the anchor of socio-
economic development in the Mediterranean region. 
The EFP plays a pivotal role in both the implementation and the design of the EMP. Eco-
nomic integration has proven to be a major driving force of continuous interaction. EFP pro-
gress and its positive results are thus crucial for the overall development of the EMP. 
The economic and institutional deficits of the Arab Mediterranean countries are essential. 
Fundamental reorganizations of the prevailing structures are necessary in order to achieve 
the Barcelona goals, even though they cause high adjustment costs within the MPs. Europe’s 
own positive experience with regional cooperation and regional stability started from eco-
nomic matters, but is only partially transferable in this context. European integration was 
from the beginning build on mutual economic interest, the political will to cooperate and the 
conviction that each member country profits from regional integration. In contrast, political 
tensions among the MPs and repeatedly escalating regional conflicts create an environment 
in the Mediterranean region that is far from optimal. 
In order to improve its performance and impact on socioeconomic development in the 
Mediterranean region, the EFP needs to prioritize more on building and improving capaci-
ties. Only then can MP businesses profit better from gains in trade and openness. At present, 
the majority of firms is neither able to apply nor to adapt recent technologies, although these 
are increasingly available in MP countries. However, capacities to run technologies and 
adopt them to country and sector specific needs, is a precondition to enhanced productivity. 
This does not only include technologies in terms of machinery or tools, but also administra-
tively mastering EU norms, rules and procedures. 
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The EMP and especially the EFP provide a framework for interaction and economic integra-
tion that is unique between industrialized and neighboring developing countries. Since 
2004, the institutional changes in the course of the recent EU-enlargement and the introduc-
tion of the ENP challenge the EFP, but also offer solutions to some of its essential shortcom-
ings. The ENP outlines e.g. the participation in the pan-European system for rules of origin, 
the opening of European technology and innovation funds for MPs, as well as positive con-
ditionality. Yet, the value-added of the ENP will not be as high for the remaining MPs as for 
the Eastern European and Caucasian states, which engage in their first structured relations 
with the EU. 
However, the ENP is not yet very well defined and still needs to be filled with details. 
Therefore it is important to provide a thorough analysis and evaluation of the EFP's past 
performance. The experiences of the MPs with economic integration and economic assets as 
the major sources of motivation for deeper cooperation can be crucial for the establishment 
and formulation of the ENP. 
International experience with economic transition indicates that the MPs' transition is likely 
to be gradual. In the case of the southern European countries Spain, Portugal and Greece, 
the economic transition took more than 20 years. Preparing themselves to join the EU as full 
members, they received substantially larger amounts of financial assistance from the EU, 
than the MPs do today. The situation with the CC-13 is similar, and after ten years it is still 
too early to say how long the transition will take. In both cases the EU membership is an 
essential incentive that most of the MPs do not and will never have. 
Against the background of the difficult economic situations and the far-reaching institu-
tional changes that the MPs are confronted with, the EFP and the Barcelona Process will take 
decades rather than years to bear fruits. Communicating realistic short to medium goals and 
modest expectations can be essential to prevent constant disappointment and frustration. As 
such, this paper shows that the generally applied benchmarks are important obstacles: The 
goals stated in the Barcelona Declaration raised high expectations due to a favorable interna-
tional and regional setting at the beginning of the EMP in 1995. Given the changed geopo-
litical context, these expectations are unrealistic and do not reflect Mediterranean realities. 
Therefore, they are not an appropriate benchmark for the evaluation of EFP performance, 
especially not in the short to medium run. The EMP is a long term strategy and a farsighted 
initiative, but learning from and drawing on valuable experience is difficult, as long as as-
sessments remain largely polarized between the diagnosis of utter failure on the one hand 
and euphemistic portrayal, on the other hand. 
 
 
Brach: Ten Years after: Achievements and Challenges 27 
References 
Arora, V. and A. Vamvakidis (2005): How Much Do Trading Partners Matter for Economic 
Growth?, in: IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 52. 
Bessis, S. (2005): Barcelona Ten Years on: The State of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 
in: La Revue Internationale et Stratégique, Vol. 59. 
Brach, J. (2002): The Economic and Financial Partnership of the Barcelona Process – Towards 
Sustainable Development?, unpublished Master Thesis, University of Tübingen, Ger-
many. 
Del Sarto, R. A. and T. Schumacher (2005): From EMP to ENP: What's at Stake with the 
European Neighborhood Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean?, in: European 
Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 10, pp. 17-38. 
Economic Research Forum (2000), Economic Trends in the MENA Region – 2000, Cairo. 
Euromed (1995): The Barcelona Declaration 28/11/1995, in: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/ 
external_relations/euromed/bd.htm (20.10.2006). 
Euromed (2000): The Barcelona Process, five years on 1995 – 2000, Luxembourg. 
Euromed (2002a): Euromed Report: Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on TRADE 
– Toledo, 10 March, 2002, Brussels. 
Euromed (2002b): Euromed Report: Regional Strategy Paper 2002-2006 & Regional Indica-
tive Programme 2002-2004, Brussels. 
European Commission (1995a): Verstärkung der Mittelmeerpolitik der EU: Vorschläge für 
die Entwicklung einer Partnerschaft Europa-Mittelmeer. KOM (95) 72 final. 1995, in: 
Bulletin der EU, Beilagen 2/95. 
European Commission (1995b): Vorschlag für die Verordnung über die MEDA-Haushalts-
linie, in: Bulletin der EU, Beilagen 2/95. 
European Commission (2001): Euromed Information Notes, Brussels. 
European Commission (2002): Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament to prepare the Meeting of Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers, 
Valencia, 22-23 April, 2002, SEC(2002) 159 final. 
European Commission (2003): Wider Europe Neighborhood: A New Framework for Rela-
tions with our Eastern and Southern Neighbors, in: Communication from the Commis-
sion, COM(2003) 104 final. 
European Commission (2004): European Neighborhood Policy – Strategy Paper, in: Com-
munication from the Commission, COM(2004) 373 final. 
EUROSTAT (2006): Comtext, Statistical Regime 4, Luxembourg. 
Ghesquiere, H. (1998): Impact of European Union Association Agreements on Mediterra-
nean Countries, in IMF Working Papers, WP/98/116. 
28 Brach: Ten Years after: Achievements and Challenges 
Handoussa, H. and Reiffers, J.-L. (2001): Economic Transition Process and the Implementa-
tion of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, FEMISE Report, Institut de la Méditer-
ranée. 
Handoussa, H. and Reiffers, J.-L. (2002): On the Evolution of the Structure of Trade and  
Investments between the European Union and its Mediterranean Partners. FEMISE  
Report, Institut de la Méditerranée. 
Hoekman, B. (1999): Free Trade Agreements in the Mediterranean: A Regional Path Towards 
Liberalization, in: G. Joffé (ed.), Perspectives in Development – The Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership, London, pp. 89-104. 
Joffé, G. (1998): Relations between the Middle East and the West – The View from the South, 
in: B. A. Roberson (ed.), The Middle East and Europe – the Power Deficit, London, New 
York, pp. 45-72. 
Joffé, G. (2001): EMP Watch: Progress of the Barcelona Process, Lisbon. 
Jünemann, A. (2001): Die EU und der Barcelona-Prozeß – Bewertung und Perspektiven, in: 
Intergration, Vol. 24, pp. 42-56. 
Jünemann, A. (2005): German Politics in the Mediterranean, in: H. A. Fernández and R. 
Youngs (eds.), The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Assessing the First Decade, Ma-
drid, pp. 111-120. 
Licari, J. (1998): The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Economic and Financial Aspects, in: 
Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 3, pp. 1-20. 
Loewe, M. (2004): Social Protection for the Informal Sector, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of 
Heidelberg, in: www.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/archiv/5561 (20.10.2006) 
Masala, C. (2000): Die Euro-Mediterrane Partnerschaft, in: ZEI Discussion Papers, Vol. C 
681, pp. 3-31. 
Nienhaus, V. (1999): Entwicklung und Entwicklungsprobleme in den Ländern des südlichen 
Mittelmeerraums, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 17, pp. 20-28. 
Parfitt, T. (1997): Europe's Mediterranean designs: an analysis of the Euromed relationship 
with special reference to Egypt, in: Third World Quarterly, Vol. 18, pp. 865-881. 
Quefelec, S. (2003a): Die Machrek-Länder und die Europäische Union, in: Statistik kurz ge-
fasst, Thema 6, No. 1. 
Quefelec, S. (2003b): Textile Industry in the Euro-Mediterranean Region, in: Statistics in  
Focus, Theme 6, No. 3. 
Quefelec, S. (2004a): Europa-Mittelmeerhandel mit Agrarerzeugnissen, in: Statistik kurz ge-
fasst, Thema 6, No. 1. 
Quefelec, S.(2004b): European FDI in the Mediterranean, in: Statistics in Focus, Theme 2, 
No. 12. 
Brach: Ten Years after: Achievements and Challenges 29 
Radwan, S. and J.-L. Reiffers (2005): The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Ten Years after 
Barcelona: Achievements and Perspectives, FEMISE Report, Institut de la Méditerranée. 
Rhein, E. (1999): Euro-Med Free Trade Area for 2010: Whom Will it Benefit?, in: G. Joffé 
(ed.), Perspectives in Development – The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, London, 
pp. 2-15. 
Tovias, A. and Bacaria, J. (1999): Free Trade and the Mediterranean, in: Mediterranean Poli-
tics, Vol.4, pp. 3-22. 
Tovias, A. and Ugur, M. (2004): Can the EU Anchor Policy Reform in Third Countries? An 
Analysis of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, in: European Union Politics, Vol. 5, 
pp. 395-418. 
Weipert, I. (2006): Neue Reformdynamik durch neue Strategien?, in: SWP Diskussionspa-
piere, Forschungsgruppe Naher/Mittlerer Osten und Afrika, No. 01. 
World Bank (2001): Global Development Finance, Washington D. C. 
World Bank (2006): World Development Indicators, Washington D. C. 
World Economic Forum (2003): The Arab World Competitiveness Report 2002-2003, New 
York. 
Zaim, F. (1999): The Third Generation of Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements: A 
View from the South, in: Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 4, pp. 36-52. 
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies / Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien
Neuer Jungfernstieg 21 • 20354 Hamburg • Germany 
E-Mail: info@giga-hamburg.de • Website: www.giga-hamburg.de
Recent issues:
No 35 Christian von Soest: Measuring the Capability to Raise Revenue. Process and Output 
Dimensions and Their Application to the Zambia Revenue Authority; December 2006
No 34 Sebastian Huhn, Anika Oettler and Peter Peetz: Construyendo Inseguridades. 
Aproximaciones a la violencia en Centroamérica desde el análisis del discurso 
[Constructed insecurities. Discourse analysis and the understanding of violence in Central 
America]; November 2006
No 33 Sebastian Huhn, Anika Oettler and Peter Peetz: Exploding Crime? Topic Management in 
Central American Newspapers; November 2006
No 32 Christian von Soest: How Does Neopatrimonialism Affect the African State? The Case of 
Tax Collection in Zambia; November 2006
No 31 Susan Steiner: Decentralisation in Uganda: Exploring the Constraints for Poverty 
Reduction; November 2006
No 30 Detlef Nolte: Potencias regionales en la política internacional: conceptos y enfoques de  
análisis [Regional Powers in International Relations: Analytical Concepts and Research 
Approaches]; October 2006
No 29 Detlef Nolte: Macht und Machthierarchien in den internationalen Beziehungen: Ein 
Analysekonzept für die Forschung über regionale Führungsmächte [Power and Power 
Hierarchies in International Relations: Towards an Analytical Concept for the Study of Regional 
Powers]; October 2006
No 28 Bert Hoffmann and Laurence Whitehead: Cuban Exceptionalism Revisited; September 2006
No 27 Andreas Mehler: Political Discourse in Football Coverage – The Cases of Côte d’Ivoire and 
Ghana; August 2006
No 26 Martin Beck: Probleme des Rentierstaats-Ansatzes in vergleichender Perspektive [Problems 
of the Rentier State Approach in Comparative Perspective]; August 2006
No 25 Dirk Kohnert: Cultures of Innovation of the African Poor. Common Roots, Shared Traits, 
Joint Prospects? On the Articulation of Multiple Modernities in African Societies and 
Black Diasporas in Latin America; July 2006
No 24 Jan Peter Wogart: Multiple Interfaces of Big Pharma and the Change of Global Health 
Governance in the Face of HIV/AIDS; June 2006
No 23 Daniel Flemes: Brazil’s Nuclear Policy. From Technological Dependence to Civil Nuclear 
Power; June 2006
No 22 Leany Barreiro Lemos and Mariana Llanos: The Politics of Senatorial Confirmations: A 
Comparative Study of Argentina and Brazil; May 2006
All GIGA Working Papers are available free of charge at www.giga-hamburg.de/workingpapers. 
For any requests please contact: workingpapers@giga-hamburg.de.
Editor of the Working Paper Series: Bert Hoffmann.
